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Introduction
With the transition to post-industrialism and financial austerity, most bismarckian
welfare states have started to face similar structural challenges for reforms since the
1970s: budgetary pressures for retrenchment contrast sharply with new demands for
social protection, resulting either from the instability of labor markets or the loosening
of traditional family structures. Hence, welfare state policies have shifted from a
dynamics of steady growth to a period of restructuring and redefinition of social
rights. Even though the precise content and timing of the reforms varies accross
countries, similarities in the new politics and social policies in bismarckian welfare
states are striking: retrenchment of existing benefits, increasingly means-tested benefit
entitlements and a stronger empasis on activation and social investment, notably with
regard to former welfare state outsiders.
Accounting for similarities and differences in this common trend is, however, all but
obvious, since a plurality of factors may have influenced the content and timing of
this process of restructuring. While many studies refer to the explanatory power of the
macro-institutional context of decision making, notably the number of veto points in
an electoral system (Immerguth 1992, Iversen 2005, Swank 2002), more recent
studies also point to the micro-institutions of the bismarckian welfare state as
variables shaping the dynamics of reform endogenously (Bonoli and Palier 1998,
2000). These micro-institutions comprise mainly the rules of eligibility and the type
of benefits and financing, as well as the actual organization of policy-management. In
addition, business cycles and/or the color of the party in government are supposed to
influence the dynamics of reform or stability (Huber and Stephens 2001, Korpi and
Palme 2003); and last but not least, the emergence of the EMU may have triggered
common dynamics of reform, as well (Palier and Manning 2003, Ferrera and Rhodes
2000).
In testing how this plurality of „usual suspects“ explains bismarckian welfare state
reforms accross countries, Switzerland is particularly promising for at least two
reasons. Firstly, the oversized Swiss coalition government has been composed of the
same major four political parties for over 45 years. National elections may shift the
power balance in the national parliament to some extent, but overall, it remains stable.
All parties have to negotiate constantly over reform and there are no sharp ideological
changes in power relations or business cycle effects. The color of the government as
an explanatory variable is therefore constant: hence, if the pace and content of the
Swiss reform trajectory is similar to the other bismarckian welfare states, it is
probably not party competition and power relations that explain these similarities in
the first place. Secondly, Switzerland is not a member of the EU. Therefore, it
provides a rare and interesting comparative test case for the direct impact of binding
EU and EMU regulations on welfare state development. If reform dynamics in
Switzerland are similar to those in other countries, the EU may not be the most
important source of change. Given these two characteristics, the Swiss case is
beneficial for the comparison in two ways: Cross-nationally, similarities between the
Swiss and other cases must be attributed to common structural and institutional
features, rather than electoral dynamics or the EU. Furthermore, EU and government
color being constant, Switzerland is also particularly well suited for a longitudinal
study of the interplay of micro- and macro-institutional factors in reform dynamics.
The main arguments of this chapter are as follows: the macro-institutions of
federalism and direct democracy led to a very slow and incremental development of
the Swiss welfare state in the industrial era. Social protection in Switzerland was
never the result of a „bismarckian master plan“, but  grew incrementally out of and
alongside pre-existing, private or sub-national policies. Hence, at the end of the
1970s, the Swiss welfare state, even though increasingly bismarckian in its overal
structure and effects, was still of a rather modest size and consisted of a pragmatic
bricolage of juxtaposed insurance and protection schemes.
In line with the overall argument of the project, I will show in this chapter that this
structure of the Swiss welfare state itself became an important explanatory variable
for the content of the ensuing reforms in two ways. On the one hand, the Swiss
welfare state displayed the typical social protection loopholes of a bismarckian male
breadwinner regime in a post-industrial context, thereby creating leeway for
modernizing reforms and a platform for new policy actors. On the other hand, the
multi-layered structure of the most developed parts of the welfare state became a
blueprint for pragmatic restructuring in various other social policies. However, the
content and dynamic of the reforms cannot be explained by endogenous factors alone.
The consensual institutional framework and the looming threat of direct democratic
votes on major social policy reforms largely account for the main mechanisms of
reform, i.e. negotiation and compensation.
A last argument concerns the magnitude and dimension of regime change. The Swiss
welfare state has rightly been described as a „latecomer“ (Obinger 1998, Armingeon
2001). This is why it entered the era of austerity at a somehow less developed stage
than most other bismarckian welfare states. The restructuring of the Swiss welfare
state since the 1970s has therefore been more of a gradual and continuous first- and
second-order adaptation, than of a radical third-order paradigm shift. (Hall 1993).
Nevertheless, some modernizing reforms since the 1990s tend to drive the Swiss
welfare state away from a typical male breadwinner bismarckian model, towards a
pragmatic hybrid of bismarckian, targeted and universalist policies. All together, these
cumulative changes – similarly to other bismarckian welfare states - add up to a
deeper transformation of the underlying principles of social policy in the direction of
a more individualized welfare regime, combining social insurance with some basic,
tax-financed minimum protection and a heavier accent on social investment.
The chapter is structured as follows. In a first part, I will review the development of
the Swiss welfare state in the „golden age“ of european capitalism until the 1970s and
assess its characterization in regime-terms. I will then lay out the way in which the
micro-institutions of the Swiss welfare state endogenously shaped the challenges to
the welfare state, before turning to an account and interpretation of the two main
strands of policy reform since the 1980s, i.e. retrenchment and modernization. The
conclusions point to the mechanisms of negotiation and learning, which are driving
the development of the Swiss welfare state, and reassess the importance of the
different explanatory variables in a comparative perspective.
1. Welfare state growth in a context of institutional power
fragmentation
In order to study the dynamics of reform after the transition to austerity and post-
industrialism, one needs to understand the type of welfare state that had developed
until this turning point. In Switzerland, welfare state growth was clearly and heavily
influenced by the macro-institutional context of power fragmentation, i.e. direct
democracy, federalism, the grand coalition and corporatism. Many authors, such as
Obinger (1998), Immerguth (1992) and Armingeon (2001) have presented striking
evidence  that these institutions have slowed down the growth of the welfare state by
several mechanisms: first of all, the federal government can only legislate on a social
policy once the authority to do so is transferred from the sub-national, i.e. cantonal
level to the federal level by a popular vote. Once this authority is established, the
nation-wide legislation that needs to be negotiated must take into account not only the
pre-existing cantonal (or private) policies, but also the main interests of all major
parties, labor and capital, because any bill proposal can again be challenged in a
popular vote, if an actor succeeds to collect 50'000 signatures against the bill.
The legislative authority for most social policies has been transferred in the late 19th
or early to mid-20th century, but in some fields, such as unemployment insurance or
occupational pensions, this happened only in the 1970s, because the social problems
were already at least partly addressed by voluntary, private and cantonal laws. The
time lag which often occurred between the consitutional amendment and the adoption
of a national bill is even more impressive (see table 1 below). In most cases, it results
from lengthy negotiations and from failures in popular referenda (most clearly in the
cases of maternity insurance and mandatory health insurance, for the establishment of
which several popular votes failed through)1.
This institutionally induced delay in welfare state growth had two main consequences
for the future development of the welfare state. The first important effect was that the
welfare state was still of a rather modest size and not „complete“ in the late 1970s,
when the economic context began to turn from prosperous to financially constraining.
Pension levels were still below the level prescribed in the constitution, no maternity
insurance existed, health insurance was voluntary and in 1975, only 22% of the
people were insured against unemployment (Armingeon 2001). It was widely
acknowledged that several social problems, such as mandatory health, unemployment
insurance or maternity protection, were still unsolved and that some expansive
reforms needed to remain on the agenda, despite the financial difficulties. Therefore,
the context of austerity after the 1970s did not trigger overall radical retrenchment,
but slower growth, selective cost containment and a differently designed development
of the welfare state (e.g. targeted expansion instead of overall growth of universal
insurance regimes).
The second consequence of the institutionally hampered growth was that the welfare
state developed in an incremental, „impure“ and layered (Streeck and Thelen 2005)
                                                 
1 From a political economy perspective, it may seem very puzzling that direct democracy hampers
welfare state growth, since the median voter should always favor more redistribution (Meltzer and
Richard 1981). However, the puzzle can be solved if one consideres that social policies in bismarckian
welfare states are often segmented, i.e. they benefit only to a specific occupatioal or social group of
beneficiaries. Moreover, reforms are often more stratifying than redistributive and finally, they can
combine very different dimensions of reform in one bill.
T1: the slow growth of the Swiss welfare state
Policy field
Constitutional 
amendment
Coming into effect of 
the national law
Time lag 
(years)
Health insurance 1890 1914 24
Mandatory health insurance 1890 1996 106
Accident insurance 1890 1918 28
Old age insurance 1925 1948 23
Disability insurance 1925 1960 35
Family benefits 1945 1953* 8
Maternity insurance 1945 2005 60
Occupational pensions 1972 1985 13
Mandatory unemployment insurance 1976 1984 8
* only in agriculture (most family allowances remain cantonal)
source: adapted from Bonoli 2006, Armingeon 2001, Gilliand 1993
fashion. When strong cantonal and private regimes existed, they were (at first) often
only harmonized or complemented with a national policy that alleviated the most
important gaps and shortcomings of the pre-existing policies (such as with
occupational pensions, unemployment insurance or family allowances). The multi-
pillar old age protection scheme illustrates this most clearly: The universal basic
pension scheme of 1948 provides contribution-related, but rather flat-rate benefits
which remain however below the target level required by the Constitution. As a
temporary solution to old-age poverty (which, of course, soon became permanent),
means-tested and tax-financed complementary benefits were therefore introduced in
1972. In addition, private and business-specific occupational pension funds had been
flourishing notably in high-skill sectors since the early 20th century (not least to
compensate for the flat-rate character of the basic pension scheme) and voluntary
private savings plans became fiscally encouraged in the 1970s. When occupational
pensions became mandatory in the early 1980s, they thus built on a strong pre-
existing structure of highly diversified private funds. Therefore, Swiss old age
security, even though bismarckian in its overall organization and effect, relies on a set
of very diversely structured social policy schemes (Nova and Häusermann 2005, BSV
1995). A similar diversity of welfare providers and policies can be observed in other
fields such as health care and family policy, where various cantonal, national and
private providers and regulations co-exist. Social assistance, for instance, is still
purely cantonal and local. In sum, Swiss social insurance was never the result of a
grand bismarckian design, but rather a slowly and pragmatically emerging bricolage
of successive and diverse layers of social policy.
One important effect of this structure on the reform dynamics after the 1980s is that
there was always little fundamental and categorical opposition to a specific type of
policy organization. Whereas in other countries such as France or Germany, the
introduction of capitalized pension funds or means-testing as such became a huge
political controversy in itself - between the defenders of the contribution-financed,
encompassing „régime général“ and the reformers -, the policy repertoire in
Switzerland was always large and reforms rather pragmatic.
Given the fragmented and underdeveloped character of the Swiss welfare state, its
classification in terms of regimes (beveridgian vs. bismarckian, liberal vs. social-
democratic vs. catholic-conservative) has been difficult and highly debated until
recently. The comparatively modest level of benefits made some authors classify it as
a liberal regime until the 1970s or advocate a separate classification of each policy
field instead of the whole national regime (Obinger 1998). Today, however, a
consensus has emerged that the Swiss regime in its overall organization and effects is
mostly bismarckian or conservative, with some liberal traits (Armingeon 2001,
Armingeon et al. 2004, Bonoli 2006, Bonoli et al. 2005). An assessment of Swiss
social policies in terms of the main bismarckian  characteristics confirms this verdict:
• Bismarckian welfare schemes typically implement work-based eligibility, i.e. only
the working population is directly entitled to benefits. This rule applied in Swiss
unemployment and accident insurance, mandatory occupational pension funds,
family allowances, and disability pensions at the beginning of the 1980s. In some
of these schemes, the work-related characteristics were and still are particularly
strong, such as for occupational pensions which only include employees with an
income over a certain threshold (of about 16'000 Euros per year in 1982) or for
cantonal family allowances that are usually granted only to employees, but not to
the self-employed. Exceptions from the rule of work-based eligibility are the basic
pension scheme (AHV) and the mandatory health insurance (as well as – of course
– social assistance), which both include all citizens, irrespective of labor market
participation2.
• Benefits in bismarckian welfare states are usually earnings-related, because the
main goal of these welfare states is not redistribution, but status protection and
income replacement. This characteristic applies most clearly in the Swiss case. A
recent study financed by the national Research Foundation comes to the striking
conclusion that overall, the Swiss welfare state does not redistribute income at all
(Künzi and Schärrer 2004). The Gini-coefficient remains constant before and after
taxes and transfers3. This is because some social policy schemes are strictly
contribution related, such as unemployment, accident, disability and – more
                                                 
2 Nevertheless, benefits in the basic pension scheme are modestly contribution-related, so that non-
employed can at best expect a minimum pension.
3 This does not imply, however, that inequality is much higher in Switzerland than in other countries,
because of the rather egalitarian distribution of incomes. Hence, the Gini-coefficient in Switzerland
before taxes and trasnfers is roughly equal to the Gini-coefficient in France after taxes and transfers
(Künzi and Schärrer 2004: 106).
recently - maternity insurance. Other schemes, mostly occupational and private
(i.e. second and third pillar) pensions, as well as health insurance are even
degressive in caracter, i.e. they benefit overproportionally to higher income
classes, because high incomes have better insurance conditions (in pensions) and
because some premiums and contributions (in pensions and health insurance) can
be deducted from taxes, which results in higher tax savings, the higher the tax
rate. These degressive schemes overcompensate the redistributive effects of the
basic pension scheme, complementary means-tested pension benefits and social
assistance. This anti-redistributive character of the Swiss welfare state was
probably somewhat weaker at the beginning of the 1980s, because health
insurance and occupational pensions were less developed, but structurally, the
system was then equally axed on stratification as it is today.
• The typical bismarckian mechanism of financing is through contributions, rather
than taxes. This also applies to a large extent to the Swiss case and has not
changed decisively since the early 1980s. More than 50% of the overall costs of
the welfare state today are contribution-financed (Künzi and Schärrer 2004: 12ff)
and this percentage was even bigger 30 years ago. Basic pensions, occupational
pensions, unemployment insurance, accident insurance and family allowances are
mostly or almost exclusively financed through payroll-taxes4. The most
redistributive parts of social policy, however, i.e. complementary pension benefits
and social assistance, are tax-financed and health insurance, which became
mandatory only in 1994, is again exceptional, because it is financed by individual
premiums, independent from income.
• The fourth main characteristic of bismarckianism, i.e. devolved and decentralized
policy management, has always been almost exemplified by the Swiss case. Trade
unions and business organizations participate in the legislation and management
of basic and occupational pensions, unemployment, accident, disability and
maternity insurance. Power fragmentation, however, goes even further. Cantons
and private welfare providers, such as health care insurance companies, play a
powerful role in most policies, such as health insurance, occupational pensions,
complementary pensions and social assistance.
                                                 
4 In addition, about 50% of benefits in the capitalized occupational pension scheme are financed by the
gains on capital.
Finally, the Swiss welfare state as it had developed until the early 1980s also shares
the typical characteristic of bismarckian welfare states to be strongly gendered, i.e. a
male breadwinner system. Maternal leave and care infrastructure were non-existent at
that time. Entitlements being heavily employment- and contribution-related, women
received much lower benefits throughout the pension-, unemployment-, accident- and
disability insurances. The occupational pension scheme was particularly exclusionary
for women, since it was accessible only for employees with a certain minimum
income per year and punished labor market mobility, excluding de facto most women
for whom discontinuous part-time work and atypical work is the standard form of
employment in Switzerland (Wanner and Ferrari 2001).
This bismarckian male breadwinner regime was confronted to financial austerity and
societal modernization from the 1970s onwards, which led to both exogenous and
endogenous challenges for reform.
2. Endogenous and exogenous challenges to the Swiss welfare state
This chapter singles out the factors supposed to explain the restructuring of the Swiss
welfare state since the 1980s. More specifically, I argue that the nature of the reforms
can be attributed to some extent to the bismarckian institutional design of the Swiss
welfare state itself, rather than to purely structural or macro-institutional variables.
Structurally, the changes confronting the Swiss welfare state are similar to those
challenging its continental european neighbours. A downturn in economic growth
since the 1970s and looming demographic changes tend to undermine the very basis
of the contribution- financed and work-related welfare state. However, it must be
noted that the „welfare without work“-problem (Esping-Andersen 1996) has always
been less severe in Switzerland than in other countries. Due to a very flexible labor
market and selective immigration policies, Switzerland had secured nearly full
employment until the 1990s, when unemployment for the first time became a lasting
reality5. Still now, however, the unemployment rate still remains below 5%
throughout the country and labor market participation rates are among the highest
                                                 
5 Between 1990 and 1997, the number of unemployed grew from 18'000 to 190'000, i.e. vom 0,5% to
more than 5%. Even though these numbers might seem low in international comparison, the sudden
appearance of (long term-)unemployment was a major shock in Switzerland.
even among older workers. Nevertheless, growth has been almost absent for the last
one and a half decades, productivity is low and the rates of long-term unemployment,
disability benefits and social assistance dependencies6 tend to rise, creating – in
combination with the negative demographic developments – a context of austerity.
Hence, demands for cost containment and retrenchment became increasingly
prominent on the reform agenda, even though – as sketched out above – major social
insurance schemes were not yet fully developed. In the mid-1990s, the Government
appointed a commission of experts, representatives from labor and capital and civil
servants to develop an encompassing overview of the financial problems and
possibilities of social insurance in Switzerland. This committee also served as a body
for the negotiation of reform priorities and its widely publicized reports (IDAFiso I
and II 1996, 1997) contributed to some limited shared understanding of the financial
possibilities and threats confronting the Swiss welfare state, even though labor and
capital’s scenarii of the expected demographic and economic developments continued
to diverge considerably (Nova and Häusermann 2005). Hence, the important point is
that a debate on cost containment and policy priorities started even before the welfare
state had reached its full development. Therefore, the pressure for retrenchment was
less severe and alternative – less cost-intensive and more targeted – instruments of
coverage expansion came to the forefront.
The institutional design of the Swiss welfare state has co-determined not only the
nature and content, but also the process of restructuring reforms. With regard to this
process, power fragmentation in the formulation and management of the welfare state,
combined with the macro-institutional framework of federalism and direct democracy
made that any reform had to be negotiated on a broad basis and that all too drastic
changes were unthinkable. Any successful reform, whether expansive or retrenching
in its effect, needs to be a compromise between the relevant interests. This
requirement, however, should not be understood only as a constraint for reform,
because the institutional configuration simultaneously provided the opportunities for
negotiation in policy-making and parliamentary committees.
                                                 
6 Most of the rise in social assistance costs must be attributed to the exclusion of long-term unemployed
from unemployment insurance benefits after 1,5 to 2 years of unsuccessful job search.
However, the strong involvement of labor and capital in the design of the Swiss
welfare state had not only a procedural, but also a substantial effect on the problem
profile from the 1980s onwards. Indeed, the second structural change – aside austerity
–, to which social policy makers were confronted was post-industrialization. The
spread of atypical, mobile and unstable work relations in an increasingly service-
dominated postindustrial economy, changing skill requirements on the labour market,
rising divorce rates and the massive entry of women into paid employment, raising
new demands for work-care balance infrastructure, have changed the social risk
structure of the industrial societies and created new challenges to the welfare state
(Bonoli et al. 2005, Bonoli 2005b,  Bonoli 2006). With regard to this challenge, the
decentralized nature of welfare state formulation and management has some
relevance, too: Being concerned primarily with the protection of standard, male
industrial employment, trade unions and employers had over time created a decidedly
bismarckian male breadwinner model, which presented many loopholes with regard to
the coverage of the abovementioned new social needs and demands. This structure of
the welfare state was not only a functional response to typically industrial risk
profiles, but reflected also the primary concerns and  interests of the constituencies of
the most important actors in welfare state development, trade unions and employers
organizations. Labor market outsiders and women never belonged to labor and
capital’s core clientele. Hence, the post-industrial loopholes in social insurance
protection are to some extent also a consequence thereof. These loopholes in social
protection became more and more pressing and visible under the influence of
accelerated structural chance from the 1970s onwards. As a consequence, some
agreement mainly accross left and value-libertarian political parties emerged with
regard to the need for modernization of policies such as maternity protection,
women’s pension rights and the protection of atypical employment (Bonoli 2006: 7,
Häusermann 2006, Häusermann et al. 2004). Hence, the very structure of the
bismarckian welfare state produced some leeway for reforms and an opportunity for
new actors to play a decisive role in welfare state restructuring.
3. The dual dynamics of reform since the 1980s
The reforms that are part of the overall restructuring of the Swiss welfare state can be
divided into two categories. The first category consists of path-dependent changes
aimed at cost containment and limited retrenchment. None of these reforms consisted
in a deep restructuring of the existing welfare state, but rather in a parametric redesign
of eligibility conditions, as well as contribution and benefit levels. In terms of Hall’s
categorization of change (1993), these reforms must be viewed as mostly first and
second order changes, insofar as either only the specific setting of an existing
insurance parameter was changed (e.g. benefit levels or contribution periods) or
selective new instruments were introduced  (e.g. new waiting periods for benefits).
However, none of these reforms modified the overall goal of the existing social
insurances, i.e. to provide encompassing income replacement to standard insured
workers and their families. Eligibility remained work-related, benefit levels
contribution-related and the whole schemes contribution-financed.
The second type of reforms, however, designed to adapt the Swiss welfare state to
post-industrial risk structures, must be seen as a more structural pattern of reform,
because these changes tend to direct the Swiss welfare state away from its male
breadwinner, bismarckian profile in mainly two ways. Firstly, they to some extent
shifted the policy goals from standard workers, male breadwinners and families to
individuals, opening insurance benefits to former outsiders, mostly women. Secondly,
the focus of social security on income replacement is being replaced by a focus on the
enhancement of employability and labor market participation. While the first set of
these reforms may be seen as second order changes (since the overall goal remained
insurance and income replacement), the second set should most probably be seen as a
more structural third order change, altering the very focus of social policy. Both sets
of changes, however, can be subsumed in a category of modernizing reforms,
adapting the Swiss welfare state to a more individualistic society and a more flexible
labor market.
3.1. Retrenchment and financial consolidation
Attempts at financial consolidation of the Swiss welfare state started as early as in the
late 1970s. The economic crisis of this decade abruptly interrupted the linear process
of growth, and put concerns about cost containment to the forefront. The widespread
new belief – mostly held within right-wing parties and employers organizations – was
that expenditure needed to be limited in order to preserve the viability of the welfare
state in the face of future economic and demographic challenges. In spite of these
concerns, considerable expansion of the Swiss welfare state continued, since many
social insurance schemes remained clearly underdeveloped in the 1970s, but the
further expansion became more modest, means-tested and overshadowed by a concern
to limit expenditures. In addition, several schemes actually did undergo retrenchment.
In pension policy, the new dynamic started already in 1976, almost two decades
before the basic pension scheme actually entered a structural financial deficit. In this
early reform, the contribution levels of self-employed were raised and the indexation
of pensions was decided not to follow wages, but only a mixed index of wages and
prices, in order to limit pension level growth. Financial consolidation continued in the
1990s with the increase of women’s retirement age from 62 to 64 and the rise of an
additional percentage-point of the value added tax on consumption, allocated entirely
to the pension system. Indeed, since the VAT level in Switzerland is still at about 7%,
i.e. far below the European average of more than 15%, consolidation through shifts to
this consumption tax are an important issue in Switzerland. However, the most recent
attempt at retrenchment was rejected in a populare vote in 2003. In this reform, the
parliament had not only decided retrenchment of widows’ pensions, a further rise in
women’s age of retirement and again an additional percentage-point of VAT for
pension insurance, but had also denied any financial support for the flexibilisation of
the retirement age7. Slightly more moderate propositions for retrenchment are now
again taken up by the government in a new reform proposal. In the mandatory second
pillar occupational pension scheme, however, cost containing reform were
successfully adopted in 2003, when the level of benefits was lowered, women’s age of
retirement was raised to 65 and the legally required level of interest rate, which
insurers have to grant on individual pension savings, was lowered. In addition, and
somewhat paradoxically, the rise of the level of means-tested complementary pension
benefits in 1985 and 1996, even though expansive in themselves, also contributed to
financial consolidation in the basic universal pension scheme. Indeed, the Swiss
Constitution states that basic pensions must be high enough to allow for a decent
existence. However, pension levels still have not and probably will never reach this
                                                 
7 It was so far the most clear and „purest“ attempt at retrenchment. Moreover, it was subjected to the
popular vote simultaneously with a tax reform alleviating taxes for higher income classes, so that the
voting campaign gave rise to a strong left-right class cleavage (Engeli 2004).
goal (BSV 1995). Hence, the strengthening of complementary pensions contributes to
legitimize the low level of first pillar pensions (Nova and Häusermann 2005).
Cost containment also became an important issue in the mandatory unemployment
insurance only a decade after its introduction in 1982. With the economic downturn in
the beginning of the 1990s, massive unemployment appeared in Switzerland for the
first time. The Swiss unemployment insurance was perfectly unprepared especially
for long-term unemployment. Therefore, the government by decree extended the
benefit period to a maximum of two years and temporarily lowered the replacement
rate from 80 to 70% in 1993. This lowering of the level of benefits was then
permanently confirmed in 1995. In addition, the 2002 reform enacted a longer
minimum contribution period for benefit rights and also cut back on the duration of
benefit entitlements from two years to one (Berclaz and Füglister 2000)
Similar cutbacks are currently under debate with regard to disability insurance. With
the appearance of unemployment, more and more labor was shed into disability
insurance for physical and psychological reasons, the insurance thereby accumulating
a huge deficit of almost a billion Swiss francs per year by the end of the 1990s (Künzi
and Schärer 2004: 44). Therefore, the upcoming reform plans to restrict access to
disability benefits, to enlarge the definition of „reasonable“ work, which a partially
disabled person is supposed to perform, to increase hurdles to eligibility, to introduce
waiting periods for benefits to up to 6 months and to raise the contribution level.
Finally, costs have most dramatically risen in health care. Basic health care insurance
has only become mandatory in 1994, but the current reform attempt is already
concerned with how to handle the annually rising costs. Since health care is financed
mainly (by about 2/3) through individual premiums, which are not set by law but by
private insurance companies, the desastrous financial development manifests itself so
far mainly through premium increases of 5-10% year after year. An average basic
insurance premium for an individual person is today no less than between 150 and
250 Euros per month. Public payments to health insurance rise as well, and there are
some public subsidies to alleviate premium costs for students and poor families, but
these cannot prevent the insurance deficit and the raising burden, which health care
imposes on household budgets especially in the middle class. Hence, the reform
currently debated in parliament is concerned with limiting costs by lowering the
catalogue of treatments included in basic insurance, pressuring medical doctors to
limit treatments and increasing the individual contribution of the patients (European
Observatory on Health Care Systems 2000).
Given the enduring economic difficulties, notably unemployment, and the lowering of
benefits described above, social assistance costs have also been rising constantly since
the 1990s (Obinger 1998).
In sum, consolidation and cost containment have been constant topics in Swiss
welfare state reforms over the last 15 years. Even though some challenges to financial
stability, notably in disability insurance and health care, are recognized by all parties,
as well as labor and capital, retrenchment remains highly controversial. In pension
policy, unemployment insurance or familiy policy, there is no agreement on the actual
problem pressure facing the Swiss welfare state, because the assumptions on future
economic and demographic development, on which both sides base their conclusions,
diverge considerably (Nova and Häusermann 2005). Given the micro- and
macroinstitutional context of welfare policy making, cost containing reform must
therefore always be negotiated and are only limited. Too drastic cuts can be
challenged by a popular referendum anytime and several attempts at cuts in pension
and unemployment insurance have been rejected in popular votes. Therefore,
retrenchment in Switzerland is limited and incremental (Bonoli et al. 2005), belonging
to the categories of first and second order change (Hall 1993).
Nevertheless, it is important to note the parallels between the mechanisms of welfare
state retrenchment in Switzerland an in the other bismarckian countries. Cost
containment by means of restructuring eligibility conditions, contribution levels and
periods, waiting periods for benefits etc. have occurred in most of these countries. In
some cases, they have not least been attributed to pressure emanating from the EMU.
However, Switzerland calls this hypothesis into question, since in this case,
retrenchment  occurred without the country being a member of the EU. Structural
pressure and the common characteristics of the bismarckian welfare states might be a
more valid common explanation of these similar reform dynamics.
3.2. Recalibrating the Swiss welfare state
This second strand of reforms is probably less important than the above described in
terms of the financial magnitude and consequences, but it is a more substantial change
in systemic terms, because it tackles the inherent weaknesses of the bismarckian
welfare state as such. These reforms can be described as recalibration (Pierson 2001)
or modernization (Bonoli 2005b, Häusermann 2005) of the welfare state, because they
adapt the welfare state to specific post-industrial social needs and demands and shift
the logic of social security from compensation to activation. Moreover, these reforms
are very different from the first set because they are mostly expansive, i.e. they
introduce genuinely new policies and policy instruments and improve the coverage of
certain categories of beneficiaries. In analyzing these reforms, one can distinguish
between a set of second-order reforms, widening eligibility and access to existing
insurance schemes for former outsiders (while maintaining the bismarckian goal of
income replacement and stratification) and a set of third order changes shifting the
goal of income compensation to activation and social investment.
The first set of societal modernization’s main thrust is in granting rights and benefit
entitlements to categories of the population who had none before. The proportion of
these systemic outsiders grew from the 1970s onwards, because more and more
people did not correspond to the profile of the standard insured anymore (Wanner and
Ferrari 2001). Indeed, bismarckian welfare state provide most complete social
security to male family fathers, working full time in stable employment, and over a
long time period in the same firm. Atypical workers, part-time employees, and
spouses typically have none or only derived rights. This welfare state is particularly
deficient with regard to the coverage of women and the young, whose benefit rights in
most schemes are decisively lower than those of men. When labor markets become
more precarious, gender roles change and families become unstable, these new risk
structures become more visible. Hence, a series of reforms since the 1990s addressed
these new social needs and demands.
Most prominently, in the field of pensions, the equal splitting of contributions and
benefits between spouses was introduced in 1995. Simultaneously, pension credits
were granted to mothers: for each year in which they raise a child below the age of 16,
they receive pension rights for a virtual income of about 2/3 of the mean income. Both
changes improve the pension rights for non-working women drastically (Nova and
Häusermann 2005, CONSOC 2003). Similarly, the second pillar occupational
pensions were extended to more low-income earners in 2003, i.e.the access threshold
to occupational pensions was lowered from about 16'000 to 12'000 Euros per year.
Even though this expansion remained clearly below the demands of the left and of
womens’ organization, it was an important signal for the recognition of the value of
(mostly female) part-time work (Häusermann 2002).
Still in the field of occupational pensions, the law on „free movement“ of 1994
enacted the rights of workers to job mobility without being punished by pension
losses. And finally, the reforms of the unemployment insurance in the 1990s extended
the benefit period and thus improved the income replacement protection of long-term
unemployed. These latter two reforms should also be seen as an adaptation of the
bismarckian welfare state to new labor market realities. Hence, all these reforms were
recalibrating, in that they extended bismarckian income protection to people who, for
various reasons, are not active on the labor market or who are not in standard
employment.
The second set of changes, by contrast, is rather focussed precisely on enhancing and
enabling standard employment through activation policies. These reforms reflect an
even deeper change of the underlying logic, because they shift the principle of social
protection from income replacement to activation and commodification.
This new trend is most visible with regard to the active labor market policies, whcih
were introduced in 1995 for the first time. This reform forced the cantons to create
25'000 places of training and activation for unemployed and these measures were
continuously improved and reinforced over the following years, notably in the reform
of 2002 (Berclaz and Füglister 2000). Within a decade, the expenditures for active
labor market policies in Switzerland have been multiplied by 6 (Bonoli et al. 2005).
The current reform of disability insurance shows a very similar thrust, including a
strenghtened committment to  reintegration and the early detection of employees at
risk.
Recent developments in family and care policy also go in the direction of enhancing
labor market participation, instead of compensating inactivity: maternity insurance for
working mothers was introduced in 2004 (after a series of failed attempts to do so
since the early 1980s) and in 2003, the national parliament voted a 4 year-credit of
200 million Swiss francs encouraging the development of a – so far almost
completely lacking – infrastructure for external child care. The most important
developments in the reconciliation of work and care, however, have taken place at the
level of the cantons and communes (Bonoli et al. 2005, Dafflon 2003), Several
cantons having implemented financial encouragement of care infrastructure, in order
to improve the possibilities for mothers and fathers to combine labor market
participation and parenthood. Even the newly introduced complementary means-
tested child allowances for poor families are designed in a way as to financially
encourage parallel labor market participation.
This account of activation policies should not obscure the fact that the modernization
of the Swiss welfare state has remained rather limited and far below the demands of
e.g. women’s organizations or the criteria that characterize a „social investment state“
(Lister 2004). A social investment state focuses on investment in human capital in
order to create and redistribute opportunities and and to enable people to earn their
own living. The above reforms mainly do go in this direction, but important problems
of care infrastructure scarcity or inefficient active labor market policies still persist
and the adoption of these reforms often depends on a series of conjunctural
conditions, such as employer’s interest in female labor market participation (Bonoli et
al. 2005). It can be hypothesized that in this specific field of reform, EU membership
would indeed have contributed to a more rapid and comprehensive reorientation of
policies (Daly, 2004; Bonoli et al. 2005). With regard to care infrastructure, for
instance, the EU has adopted a directive in 2002 that establishes a target of 90%
coverage of external care for children between 3 years and schooling age until 2010, a
target Switzerland will doubtlessly miss by far.
In terms of the development of the bismarckian welfare states, modernization since
the 1970s has also been marked by an interesting procedural change. Indeed, in the
past, most reforms were designed in specialized extra-parliamentary committees
composed of civil servants, trade union and business representatives, before they were
handed over to parliament, where they were hardly modified and most of the time
merely approved (Kriesi 1980, Sciarini 1999). Most of the recent modernizing reform
elements, however, have not been introduced by trade unions and employer
organizations, but only at a later stage of the reform process, i.e. by the political
parties in parliament. In virtually  all the important reforms of the 1990s – the pension
reforms of 1995 and 2003, the unemployment reform of 1995 and the current
disability insurance reform – labor and capital were mainly stuck in controversies
over the extent of retrenchment and it was only in parliament, that the modernizing
elements of reform were added (Bonoli 1999, Häusermann et al. 2004). Among other
reasons, this can be explained by the fact that recalibration benefits mainly to welfare
state and labor market outsiders – women, unemployed, young families, atypical
workers – who do not belong to the main clientele of labor and capital (Häusermann
et al. 2004). Somewhat ironically, thus, the bismarckian male breadwinner welfare
state that the social partners built until the 1980s became the very reason for those
actors’ declining power in designing welfare state reforms more recently.
The modernization of the Swiss welfare state, should, however, not be considered as a
radical upheaval. Rather, in a pragmatic and incremental fashion, new recalibrating
elements were either added to the existing bismarckian insurance policies or these
latter insurance policies were used to cover new risk profiles. Hence, the process of
institutional change can probably most adequately be characterized by mechanisms of
continuous layering and conversion (Streeck and Thelen 2005), whereby new logics
of action are added to the prevailing institutions and existing institutions are
redirected towards new functions.
For the sake of comparison and synthesis, the following table summarizes the three
broad stages and categories of Swiss welfare state development in a synthetic manner:
Conclusion: negotiation and learning as mechanisms of reform
In this chapter, I have shown that the Swiss welfare state has indeed changed
significantly since the 1970s in several respects. None of the four main characteristics
of the bismarckian welfare state has been altogether transformed or abolished, but all
of them are somewhat altered: A) Work-based eligibility is still the main form of
benefit entitlement. However, modernizing reforms have somewhat widened the
eligibility, by granting pension credits, based on a virtual income, to mothers and by
recognizing more flexible and atypical forms of employment, such as part-time
employment and job mobility in occupational pensions. B) Benefits continue to be
heavily earnings-related. The Swiss welfare state is hardly redistributive and this
characteristic has even been reinforced with the strengthening of the degressive
occupational pension scheme and premium-financed health insurance. Social policy in
Switzerland does not mean redistribution, but status protection. It is only the rise in
social assistance expenditures, public subsidies for the financing of health care
premiums for poor households and the extension of means-testing complementary
pension benefits that point to some consolidation of a level of minimum protection. C)
The financing has not changed radically, since most benefits are still financed through
Type of change Context Diagnosis Content of the 
policy
Politics of the 
reform
Consequences
Growth  until 
the late 1980s
full employment; 
industrialism; 
economic 
growth; 
"The Swiss 
Welfare State is 
incomplete and 
needs to be 
developed to 
provide sufficient 
insurance to all 
workers"
Development of 
mandatory 
insurance 
schemes; 
consolidation of 
basic minimum 
benefits; 
Negotiated 
compromises 
between labor and 
capital;
Slow development of 
the Swiss welfare 
state as a 
bismarckian 
latecomer;
Cost 
containment  
and 
consolidation 
since the 1980s
Economic 
recession / slow 
growth; 
demographic 
changes; 
endogenous 
growth of welfare 
expenditures;
"Expenditures 
need to be limited 
in order to 
preserve the 
viability of the 
welfare state"
Selective 
retrenchments of 
benefits; limited 
and only means-
tested expansion;  
Highly 
controversial 
negotiations 
between capital, 
labor and political 
parties;  No 
agreement on 
overall reform 
pressure; 
First-order changes: 
parametric reforms; 
second-order 
changes: new policy 
instruments to 
guarantee the 
financial viability of 
the old insurance 
schemes;
Modernization 
since the 1990s
Postindustrialism
; unstable labor 
markets and 
family structures;
"The welfare state 
needs to be 
adapted to new 
risk profiles; 
social investment 
is more 
economical than 
social  
compensation"
Inclusion of 
welfare state 
outsiders; 
Activation of 
unemployed, 
disabled and 
mothers;
Negotiated 
compromises 
between political 
parties (and 
sometimes labor 
and capital); 
Second-order 
change: conversion 
of existing insurance 
schemes into new 
purposes; third-order 
change: shift of 
policy goals from 
compensation to 
activation by means 
of layering; 
T2: Summary table of the development of the Swiss welfare state
contributions or premiums (or through gains from capital, as in the occupational
pension scheme). However, there has indeed been some reinforcement of tax-
financing, through the rise in federal and cantonal contributions to social insurances,
the expansion of tax-financed social assistance and complementary pensions and the
increase in the value-added tax (VAT) to stabilize the financing of public pensions.
Further increases of the VAT are also on the agenda for the next years to come, not
only for pension financing, but also in favor of the disabiltiy insurance, which is in
deep deficit. D) Finally, labor and capital do stay important actors in the management
and implementation of social insurances, notably with regard to unemployment
insurance and active labor market measures. However, political parties have become
more relevant in policy formulation, compared to the past. Many recent modernizing
reforms were designed by the parties in parliament, rather than by labor and capital in
the pre-parliamentary negotiations. This may be explained by the inability of the
social partners to foster compromises over retrenchment, by the higher proportion  of
women in parliament (Bonoli 2006) or by the stronger sensibility of parties to
libertarian values and gender equality, as compared to trade unions and business
organizations (Häusermann et al. 2004).
The Swiss reform trajectory displays some striking similarities with reform dynamics
in other bismarckian welfare states, notably some amount of benefit retrenchment, the
increasing reliance on means-tested social protection minima, the growing proportion
of tax-financing as compared to contributions and a growing accent on activation
measures. Given that power relations are constant and that Switzerland is not a
member of the EU, these commonalities should most probably be attributed to
similarities in the structural challenges and the micro-institutions of the design of
bismarckian welfare states.
Institutions, both on the macro-level of decision-making and on the micro-level of
policy design, indeed played a crucial role in shaping the underlying mechanisms of
the Swiss reform trajectory. As a conclusion, I would like to point to  two of these
mechanisms that weight heavily on the reform dynamics, i.e. negotiation and
learning.
Both the micro-institutions of the welfare state and the macro-instituitons of Swiss
decision-making spread power accross a wide range of actors. Not only are all
relevant actors involved in decision-making, but every reform in Switzerland can be
challenged in a popular referendum vote. Hence, reforms must be carefully balanced
in order to gather sufficient support from diverse collective actors. In this respect, the
simultaneous emergence of cost containment and modernization since the 1980s is no
coincidence, because in many reforms, the combination of both types of reform in a
single reform proposal ensured precisely this requested support. Hence, the
modernizing reforms often benefit from rather unexpected cross-class coalitions
between leftist and socially liberal actors, because they combine retrenchment of
existing benefits with expansive elements in favor of former outsiders. This pattern of
reform could e.g. be observed in the 1995 pension reform and the 1995
unemployment insurance reform (Bonoli 1999, Häusermann et al. 2004, Häusermann
2006), but also in the 2003 reform of occupational pensions (Häusermann 2002) or
the current reform of the disability insurance. Hence, the two strands of reform since
the 1970s are not sequentially linked, one following the other, but rather politically
and functionally.
Finally, learning has also become an important mechanism of reform. As I have
outlined at the beginning of the chapter, the Swiss welfare state grew in a pragmatic,
layered fashion. Slowly growing insurance schemes were gradually complemented by
additional policies, designed to alleviate the most important loopholes. The system of
old age protection exemplifies this logic, since it relies on a „multipillar“ logic, which
has incrementally developed over time: flat-rate universal PAYG-pensions are
complemented by means-tested and tax-financed supplementary benefits, capitalized
occupational pensions and voluntary, fiscally encouraged private pension savings
plans. This system, combining different logics of benefits and financing, proves to be
more resilient to structural and demographic challenges than purely bismarckian
regimes and has recently become a model for reform, promoted inter alia by the
OCDE and the IMF. The multi-pillar structure of social protection has, however, also
triggered learning processes at the national level. Recent reform propositions (e.g.
Bauer et al. 2004 ) call for the emulation of this design in the fields of family and
health policy, i.e. for a combination of an egalitarian, tax-financed minimum
protection for the purpose of poverty relief, with PAYG- oder capitalized insurance
benefits aimed at status protection. Hence, the design of the existing welfare state
itself feeds back into the dynamics of reform.
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